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Dad Was Born A Thousand Years Ago? An
Examination of Post-Mortem Conception and
Inheritance, with a Focus on the Rule Against
Perpetuities
Joshua Greenfield ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
A man is presumed to be the father of a child if he is
married to the child’s mother at the time of the child’s birth or if
the child is born within 300 days after the marriage is
terminated by death. 1 The presumption of parenthood is an
outgrowth of the common law rule that a child born to a widow
within 280 days of her husband’s death is the legal issue of the
widow’s husband. 2 This presumption is important because most
people die intestate (without a will). 3 While rules on intestate
succession vary, the deceased’s estate is typically divided among
any surviving spouse and children. A death-imposed natural
limit on a father’s paternity characterized the outer limits of
parentage possible until 1949, when a viable method for
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1. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1)–(3) (2002), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/upa/final2002.pdf.
The assumption also
applies to dissolution of the marriage by annulment, declaration of invalidity,
divorce, or court decree of separation. Id. The presumption of parenthood is
rebuttable by adjudication. Id. § 204(b).
2. Robert J. Kerekes, My Child . . . But Not My Heir: Technology, the Law,
and Post-Mortem Conception, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 213, 214 (1996).
3. Id. at 225.
∗
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preserving sperm outside of the male body was discovered. 4
This discovery made it technologically possible for a man to
fertilize an ovum after his death, resulting in paternity of a child
The
born more than 300 days after the father’s death. 5
possibility of a child born long after a father’s death, who is
therefore potentially not recognized as the legal heir of the
father, is significant because much of the legal interaction that is
taken for granted between a child and his or her parent is based
upon the law’s presumption of legitimacy. Prominent among
these interactions are the laws that determine how a child
inherits from his or her parent, whether through testate or
intestate succession.
Though the technology has existed for decades, and potential
problems were recognized fairly early, 6 issues surrounding the
treatment of children of posthumous conception for inheritance
purposes have become far more pressing in the past decade.
Over the fifty-five year period between 1998 and 2052,
Americans will engage in a wealth transfer of at least $41
trillion through both testate and intestate succession. 7 If the
problems discussed in this article were involved in even 1/100 of
1% of this transfer, more than $4 billion would be at issue.
This article will begin by giving a brief history of assisted
reproduction technologies, allowing the reader to understand
how we came to the present dilemma. It will then focus on two
4. Cindy L. Steeb, A Child Conceived After His Father’s Death?:
Posthumous Reproduction and Inheritance Rights.
An Analysis of Ohio
Statutes, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137, 140 (2000).
5. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father’s Last
Will, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 91 (2004). This possibility became reality in 1977: “an
Australian newspaper reported that a widow had given birth to a child using
her deceased husband’s cryopreserved sperm.” Id. at 92 (citing Carolyn
Sappideen, Life After Death—Sperm Banks, Wills and Perpetuities, 53 AUSTL.
L.J. 311, 311 n.4 (1979)). While it is now possible for women to reproduce postmortem through cyropreservation of eggs and embryos and the use of a
surrogate, this technology will not be discussed in this article.
6. Id. at 92 (noting that in 1962, Harvard Professor W. Barton Leach
predicted the challenges that births from cyropreservation of sperm would
provide for the Rule against Perpetuities).
7. John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 Trillion Wealth
Transfer Estimate is Still Valid: A Review of Challenges and Comments, 7 J.
GIFT PLAN. 11, 11 (2003). The $41 trillion figure commonly reported in the
media is the result of an assumed “real secular growth” rate of 2%. Id. A 3%
growth rate would result in a wealth transfer of $73 trillion and a 4% rate in a
$136 trillion transfer. Id. The value of household wealth had a growth rate of
3.34% (inflation adjusted) for the period of 1950-2001. Id. at 11-12.
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areas where post-mortem conception has the potential to interact
with current law: 8 the inheritance rights of post-mortemconception children 9 and the potential effect of cryopreservation
technology on the Rule against Perpetuities. 10 Attempts have
been made over the years to adapt the law to new reproductive
technologies. None of them fully answered the questions posed,
and all failed to keep up with changing technology.
This article will conclude that the only workable solution for
dealing with post-mortem-conception children and their
inheritance rights is to establish a hard cutoff for establishing
paternity in those children who it can not be proven were in
gestation at the time of the father’s death. Any testate provisions
that provide for after-born children must be “reworked” to match
the testator’s intent as best as possible, without violating the
new rule. Any reworking must also take into account the Rule
against Perpetuity’s original purpose.

8. These issues are far from the only ones raised by post-mortem
conception. Two of the most discussed topics not addressed in this article are
the status of sperm and embryos as property and the ethical ramifications of
allowing harvesting of sperm after brain death. For a discussion of the property
status of sperm, see Andrea Corvalán, Fatherhood After Death: A Legal and
Ethical Analysis of Posthumous Reproduction, 7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 335, 33851 (1997). Responses to the issue of harvesting sperm post-brain death have
varied but there may be a growing mini-consensus that the procedure should be
allowed when there is a showing of pre-mortem intent and approval by the
decedent’s spouse/partner.
See NEW YORK HOSPITAL GUIDELINES FOR
CONSIDERATION OF REQUEST FOR POST-MORTEM SPERM RETRIEVAL,
http://www.cornellurology.com/guidelines.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2005)
(maintaining that the wife, as next of kin, should be the only one empowered to
make the decision on post-mortem sperm harvesting); see also Michele Chabin,
Israeli Parents Unable to Harvest Dead Son’s Sperm, Court Decides, J. THE
JEWISH NEWS WKLY OF N. CAL., Dec. 5, 2003, available at
http://www.jewishsf.com/ (search “Israeli parents unable to harvest dead son’s
sperm”; then click on hyperlink to article). Britain has “actively discouraged”
post-mortem harvesting since 1984. Knaplund, supra note 5, at 100-01. Postmortem harvesting may be becoming more prevalent in the United States; in
1995 fertility clinics reported more than forty such requests, as many request as
reported total in the fourteen previous years. Id. at 93-94.
9. Post-mortem-conception children refers to any situation where a child is
conceived or an embryo implanted after one of the child’s biological parents has
died. Exceptions are anonymous donors or surrogacy arrangements in which
the biological parent(s) were never intended to act as legal parent(s).
10. “[T]he rule against perpetuities is ‘No interest is good unless it must
vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the
creation of the interest.’” JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 302
(5th ed. 2002) (quoting JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201
(4th ed. 1942)).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. THE TECHNOLOGY
Although it is not certain where the idea first arose that a
child could be conceived other than through sexual intercourse,
the recognition of such a possibility is at least 2000 years old. 11
The idea was first put into practice over 600 years ago as a way
of gaining an edge in battle when Arab tribes tried to dilute the
gene pool of enemy tribes’ horses by artificially inseminating
their mares with the sperm of inferior male horses. 12 While such
practices may have seemed radical in the past, today it is
possible, conventional, and almost commonplace to at least
consider the possibility of attempting to have children without
engaging in sexual intercourse. 13
A woman was first artificially inseminated in a procedure
performed by an English doctor, Dr. John Hunter, in 1770. 14
The first known successful use of the procedure in the United
States occurred in 1884. 15 Scientists have known for some time
that sperm could remain viable through cryopreservation, 16 the
act of storing a substance in a frozen state. 17 Cryopreservation
11. Steeb, supra note 4, at 139.
The oldest known writing that
contemplates conception without intercourse is a 22 A.D. Talmudic document.
Id. The document tells of a rabbi’s discussion that a woman might become
pregnant from being in bath water ‘contaminated’ with sperm. Id.
12. James E. Bailey, An Analytical Framework for Resolving the Issues
Raised by the Interaction Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of
Inheritance, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 746 (1998); accord Steeb, supra note 4, at
140.
13. See Sharona Hoffman & Andrew P. Morriss, Birth After Death:
Perpetuities and the New Reproductive Technologies, 38 GA. L. REV. 575, 595
(2004) (stating that approximately 400,000 frozen embryos are stored in the
United States). The number of frozen embryos does not include the number of
gametes (eggs and sperm) that are cryogenically stored in the United States. Id.
at 593-98.
14. Steeb, supra note 4, at 140. There is disagreement as to whether this
procedure was actually successful. See Bailey, supra note 12, at 746 n.10
(acknowledging the attempt by Dr. Hunter and asserting that it was
unsuccessful).
15. Bailey, supra note 12, at 746. The women was a medical student, as
was the sperm donor. Differing eyewitness accounts make this claim uncertain.
Id. at 818 n.11.
16. See Steeb, supra note 4, at 140 (“[I]n 1866, an Italian scientist,
Montegazza, discovered that sperm could survive being frozen.”).
17. P.L. Matson et al., Cryopreservation: Sperm and Embryos – Results in
Question, in ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 123 (R.W. Shaw ed., 1995).
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was unsuccessful until 1949, however, when scientists
discovered that adding a small amount of glycerol before freezing
greatly increased the viability rate of the sperm. 18 Artificial
insemination using cryopreserved sperm was first successfully
achieved in Australia in 1977. 19
Cryopreservation is currently the only technique by which
semen may be stored for extended periods. 20 The freezing
process destroys a number of sperm, but the survival rate is
approximately 48% to 79%. 21 The maximum length of time that
sperm can remain viable is not currently known, but estimates
range from twelve years 22 to centuries. 23 Sperm frozen for
twenty-one years has been successfully used in artificial
insemination. 24
Cryopreservation of sperm has been used by (among others)
astronauts, 25 soldiers, 26 and cancer patients receiving
Cryopreservation can be achieved through a process of freezing and vitrification
(conversion of a liquid into a glass). Id.
18. Id. at 127.
19. See Knaplund, supra note 5, at 92 & n.8.
20. Matson et al., supra note 17, at 123.
21. K. Sueoka et al., A New Strategy for the Treatment of Male Infertility
Due to Severe Oligozoospermia and Azoospermia, in ADVANCES IN HUMAN
REPRODUCTION 366 (F.A. Moeloek, B. Affandi, & A.O. Trouson eds., 1993). The
recovery rate of viable sperm from a frozen state ranges from 48% (plus or
minus 6%) to 79% (plus or minus 8%), depending on the cyropreservation buffer
used. Id. Merely adding glycerin to the solution resulted in the 48% recovery
rate, while adding glycerin, egg yolk, and Pluronic F68 resulted in the 79%
recovery rate. Id. A buffer of glycerin and egg yolk resulted in a 69% (plus or
minus 11%) recovery rate. Id.
22. Sperm
Bank
Directory,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
http://www.spermbankdirectory.com/faq4.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
23. Stanley W. Ashley, Frozen Sperm May Last for Generations, YOUR
FAMILY
DOCTOR,
http://www.onlineambulance.com/articles/doc/3/grp/Men/art/FrozenSperm.htm (last visited Oct.
17, 2005); see also Q & A: Frozen Sperm, BBC NEWS, May 25, 2004,
http://newswww.bbc.net.uk/2/hi/health/3745775.stm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005)
(asserting that cryopreserved sperm “has no apparent sell-by date”).
24. Baby Born from 21-Year-Old Sperm, BBC NEWS, May 25, 2004,
http://newswww.bbc.net.uk/2/hi/health/3742319.stm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
The baby was born from sperm frozen by the father at age seventeen. Id. The
father froze his sperm in anticipation of going sterile from treatment for
testicular cancer. Id.
25. Bailey, supra note 12, at 746 (“Modern, widespread application of
technological advances . . . probably began during the early days of the United
States space program. In 1962, Mercury astronauts had their sperm frozen for
future use in case exposure to cosmic radiation while in orbit rendered them
sterile.”).
26. See Knaplund, supra note 5, at 91 n.8 (stating that soldiers deployed to
the Persian Gulf frequently went to the sperm bank before leaving).
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chemotherapy or radiation therapy. 27 Its use is rising, as the
Second Gulf War has prompted a “record increase in visits by
The use of
departing military men” to sperm banks. 28
cryopreservation will most likely increase as the technology
continues to lengthen the time sperm can be viably
cryopreserved and tests continue to show the effectiveness of the
procedure. 29
B. THE LAW
Prior to the Uniform Parentage Act, children born after the
biological father’s death were considered to be valid issue of the
father if they lived 120 hours after birth 30 and were born within
280 days of their father’s death. 31 In 1973, the 280-day period
was extended to 300 days in the Uniform Parentage Act, 32 which
also made the presumption of paternity rebuttable. 33 Following
the promulgation of the Uniform Parentage Act, it became
increasingly obvious that children were being born or would soon
be born who would strain the limitations of the Uniform
Parentage Act.
In 1988, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act. 34 The
purpose of the Act was to “effect the security and well being of
those children born and living in our midst as a result of assisted

27. See id. (noting a fear among patients that the treatments will make
them sterile).
28. Ellen Gamerman, For U.S. Troops, a Personal Mission, BALT. SUN, Jan.
27, 2003, at 1A.
29. In a recent study, frozen sperm was found to be as effective as fresh
sperm for effective in vitro fertilization. Mayo Clinic, Frozen, Fresh Sperm Both
Effective
for
In
Vitro
Fertilization,
May
12,
2004,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/news2004-rst/2258.html.
Data from a ten-year
period was collected, the data contained 1,580 cycles of fresh sperm attempts
and 309 cycles using frozen sperm. Id. Cycles using fresh sperm produced a
success rate of 51.6%, cycles using frozen sperm produced a success rate of
53.1%. Id.
30. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-108 (2006).
31. Kerekes, supra note 2, at 214 (stating that the 280 days is a common
law court doctrine developed through the guidance of the Uniform Probate
Code).
32. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1) (1973) (amended 2002), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/upa7390.pdf.
33. Id. § 4(b).
34. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILD. OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (1988).
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conception.” 35 The Act provides that “[a]n individual who dies
before implantation of an embryo, or before a child is conceived
other than through sexual intercourse, using the individual’s egg
The
or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child.” 36
justification for not considering a genetic post-mortemconception parent a legal parent is to provide for “finality for the
determination of parenthood of those whose genetic material is
utilized in the procreation process after their death.” 37
Though the desirability for finality in determining
parenthood is a laudable goal, there are both moral and legal
problems that arise from a firm cutoff period. Therefore, any
scheme which involves such a firm cutoff period should be
narrowly tailored to meet the societal goals of providing for
efficient transfer of property from the deceased while minimizing
any harm visited upon posthumously conceived children.
A child has the constitutional right to a determination of
paternity. 38 This right has never been qualified to exist only for
those children with living parents, nor should it. It would be
illogical to consider a right belonging to Person A as dependent
upon the status of Person B.
C. TESTATE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION
It is generally agreed that provisions in a testator’s will that
provide for post-mortem-conception children are valid, 39 subject
to the Rule against Perpetuities. While this notion may be
comforting, it is not as helpful as one might initially think in
analyzing the inheritance rights of post-mortem-conception
children. The majority of Americans die intestate. 40 Therefore,

35. Id. prefatory note. The act was meant to address the “status of
children, their rights, security, and well being.” Id.
36. Id. § 4(b).
37. Id. § 4 cmt. (noting that section 4(b) was designed in response to
controversy caused by the problem in Australia in the 1980s). This rule
coincides with British law under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
of 1990. See Knaplund, supra note 5, at 101 (stating that the British law
provides that where the sperm of a man is used after his death, the man is not
to be treated as the father of a resulting child).
38. State ex rel. Henderson v. Woods, 865 P.2d 33, 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994)
(citing State v. Santos, 702 P.2d 1179, 1181–82 (Wash. 1985)).
39. Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of
Reproductive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV 1091, 1155 (1997). The article
suggests that the conveyance could be effected either through keeping open the
estate, or setting up a statutory trust with the as yet unconceived child as
beneficiary. Id.
40. Kerekes, supra note 2, at 225. (“[S]tudies indicate that the large
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it is important to decide how to treat post-mortem-conception
children whose parents died intestate.
An important case in the development of modern intestacy
law is Trimble v. Gordon. 41 In Trimble, a mother challenged the
constitutionality of an Illinois statute that disallowed intestate
succession of illegitimate children from their father. 42 The Court
held that the Illinois statue was in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 43 Based on Trimble, any
distinction that is made based on the legitimacy of the child (or
presumably a similar status) must be narrowly tailored.
Cases that have arisen in this area have primarily dealt
with post-mortem-conception children seeking benefits from the
state as survivors of their late biological father. The first case
that arose was Hart v. Chater. 44 Hart arose after Nancy Hart
successfully used her deceased husband’s cryopreserved sperm to
conceive a child. 45 Ms. Hart sought Social Security survivor's
benefits for her daughter, Judith Christine Hart, as the daughter
of her late husband. 46 When Ms. Hart was denied Social
Security benefits for her daughter, she filed for a hearing with
the Social Security Administration. Although Ms. Hart was
unsuccessful the both at the trial and appellate level, 47 the
Social Security Administration eventually reversed its position
and decided to award survivor benefits to Judith Hart despite
the previous judgments. 48

majority of people die intestate.”) (quoting JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M.
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 67 (5th ed. 1995)).
41. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
42. Id. at 763.
43. See id. at 776.
44. (Soc. Sec. Admin. Hearing) (March 27, 1995) (Torres, A.L.J.), cited in
Kerekes, supra note 2, at 232. The material on the Hart case is on file with Mr.
Kerekes.
45. Kerekes, supra note 2, at 232. The sperm had been frozen in
anticipation of chemotherapy for the treatment of cancer. The chemotherapy
was ultimately unsuccessful, and Edward Hart died. Id.
46. Id. Nancy Hart also sought (and presumably received) survivor benefits
for herself. Id.
47. See id. at 232-39. The Appeals Council found that Judith Hart could
not inherit as a “child” under Louisiana state law, nor was she Edward Hart’s
“child” within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Id.
48. Id. at 239-40 (basing its reversal on the “significant policy issues” raised
by Hart that were not contemplated when the Social Security Act originally was
passed, and deciding that a resolution of those issues should involve the
legislative and executive branches).
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The issue next made headlines in early 2002 with Woodward
v. Commissioner of Social Security. 49 In Woodward, the court
sought to answer the following question:
If a married man and woman arrange for sperm to be withdrawn from
the husband for the purpose of artificially impregnating the wife, and
the woman is impregnated with that sperm after the man, her
husband, has died, will children resulting from such pregnancy enjoy
the inheritance rights of natural children under Massachusetts’ law of
intestate succession? 50

The court answered the above question in the affirmative
but limited its application to certain circumstances. 51 In order
for a post-mortem-conception child to qualify as the legal child of
the deceased, a two-part test must be met. 52 First, the child
must be shown to be the genetic child of the decedent. 53 Second,
the survivor must then establish that the “decedent affirmatively
consented to posthumous conception and to the support of any
resulting child.” 54
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts observed that the Massachusetts intestacy
statute lacked an express requirement that children be alive or
in existence at the time of their parents’ death. 55 In the absence
of an express legislative intent to require that posthumous
children exist as of the date of the deceased parent’s death, the
court engaged in a balancing test. 56 The court weighed the
“[l]egislature’s overriding purpose to promote the welfare of all
children,” 57 against the legislative goals of “requiring certainty of
filiation between the decedent and his issue,” and “establishing
limitations periods for the commencement of claims against the
intestate estate.” 58
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed the
49. 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002).
50. 760 N.E.2d at 259. Although the question, as phrased by the court,
applies only to married couples, it is doubtful any distinction between married
and unmarried couples could be made. In Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977), the Supreme Court held that removing children from their father’s line
of intestate succession based on their legitimacy status to be unconstitutional.
51. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 259.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (noting that even where both parts of the test are met, “time
limitations may preclude commencing a claim for succession rights on behalf of
a posthumously conceived child.”).
55. See id. at 264.
56. See id. at 264-65.
57. Id. at 266.
58. Id.
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effect of post-mortem conception on intestate succession in
Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart. 59 Rhonda Gillett-Netting gave birth
to twins from her husband’s sperm on August 6, 1996,
approximately eighteen months after he died. 60 Gillett-Netting
sought to have her children declared as legally those of her
deceased husband so that they could collect Social Security
survivor's benefits. After being denied by the Social Security
Administration and the trial court, 61 Gillett-Netting received a
favorable ruling from the appellate court. 62
The appellate court noted that the issue before it was a
matter of first impression for any court at the federal appellate
level but also mentioned the recent opinion in Woodward. 63
Although the reasoning of the appellate court was consistent
with that of the Woodward court, the Gillett-Netting court added
significant dicta in its opinion regarding post-mortem-conception
children and intestate succession.
The appellate court
distinguished between legitimacy for the purposes of gaining
survivors benefits and legitimacy for the purpose of inheriting
under intestacy statutes. 64 If the appellate court had found the
children legitimate for all purposes, they would have had a right
to inherit intestate from their father despite their status as postmortem-conception children.
In sum, Trimble established that allowing intestate
succession based on the legitimacy status of a child is
unconstitutional. 65 Soon after, Heart established the right of
children to receive Social Security survivor benefits even if
conceived after the death of a parent. 66 Though the outcome in
Heart was the result of a Social Security Administration
decision, Woodward made this decision the law, at least in

59. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
60. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 963 (D. Ariz. 2002),
rev’d 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). Mr. Netting had deposited his sperm to be
frozen and stored for future use by his wife before he began treatment for
cancer. 371 F.3d at 594.
61. See 231 F. Supp. 2d at 963-64.
62. See Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 599.
63. Id. at 596 n.3.
64. Id. at 599 n.8 (“Because Juliet and Piers are Netting’s legitimate
children under Arizona state law, we need not consider whether they could be
deemed dependent for another reason, such as their ability to inherit property
from their deceased father under Arizona intestacy laws.”).
65. Trimble, 430 U.S. 762.
66. See Kerekes, supra note 44.
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Massachusetts. 67 The position was further supported by the
ninth circuit in Gillett-Netting. 68
D. THE EFFECT ON THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
The Rule against Perpetuities was created to prevent
decedents from controlling assets from beyond the grave. 69 The
rule states, “[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the
creation of the interest.” 70 Two of the most important facets of
the rule are that it is a rule of logical proof 71 and that an interest
is not considered vested in a class as long as the class is subject
to open. 72 The rule is a rule of logical proof because it requires a
possibility to be logically impossible before it will discount it (i.e.,
the fertile octogenarian 73 ). The second condition, the nonvesting of an interest in a class subject to open, means that as
long as it is possible for a class to be added to, then an interest
does not vest in that class. These two rules interact often; a
testate gift to the class consisting of the children of X cannot vest
until X dies.
As a rule of proof, the rule does not consider how unlikely or
likely an event is to occur; so long as there exists any logical
possibility, no matter how remote, of an occurrence, the rule
takes it into account. 74 The most commonly given examples of
scenarios that are logically possible, though extremely
improbable, are the fertile octogenarian and the unborn widow. 75
67. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002).
68. Gillet-Netting, 371 F.3d 593.
69. See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity Of Well-Being and the
Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1746 (2003); DUKEMINIER &
KRIER, supra note 10, at 303.
70. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, at 302.
71. Id. at 303.
72. Id. at 311.
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP., infra note 75.
74. Id. at 303.
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4
reporter’s note 7, 8 (1983). The fertile octogenarian scenario exists because the
rule assumes that all people are capable of bearing children regardless of their
age. Id. cmt. h, reporter’s note 7. Though this may have been absurd in the
seventeenth century, when the rule originated, the same technology that makes
post-mortem conception possible could make this scenario less absurd. A classic
example of the fertile octogenarian problem played out in real life is Jee v.
Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787). The unborn widow scenario
holds that the phrase “X’s widow” refers to whoever is married to X at the time
of X’s death not who is married to X at the time, and that said person may as yet
be unborn at the time of the reference.
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Analyzing the inheritance rights of post-mortem-conception
children is a problem because of the combination of the rule’s two
facets listed above (logical proof and open class). For centuries, a
gift “to all my children” or “to the heirs of my body” was
understood to capture a closed class. When a person died, the
class of potential heirs would necessarily be fixed. 76 This is no
longer the case today, as a third and possibly much more far
reaching scenario must be considered, “the 100 year dead
father.”
Imagine Mr. Smith: Mr. Smith is divorced, has two children,
and was recently diagnosed with cancer. Desiring to have more
children in the future, Mr. Smith has his sperm cryopreserved
before chemotherapy. The therapy is unsuccessful and Mr.
Smith succumbs to the cancer. Mr. Smith had the foresight to
draft a will, and in this will he leaves his estate to “all my
children upon reaching the age of 18,” with the exception of the
cryogenically preserved sperm, which he leaves to his parents so
that they might have more grandchildren through him. For the
purposes of the Rule against Perpetuities, the validating life at
this point would most likely be any of among Mr. Smith’s
children and his parents. 77
Five years later, as Mr. Smith’s parents are on a drive with
Mr. Smith’s two children, they die in a car accident. Mr. Smith’s
parents have left everything to Mr. Smith’s brother, their only
remaining child. Included in “everything” is the still-unused
cryopreserved sperm. Mr. Smith’s brother, seeking to replace
the family he lost, finds a surrogate mother to be impregnated by
his brother’s cryopreserved sperm. The impregnation succeeds,
and a child is born. This child, biologically Mr. Smith’s, will not
reach the age of eighteen (the qualifying age in Mr. Smith’s will)
until twenty-three years after Mr. Smith’s death, thus violating
the Rule against Perpetuities. Due to this possibility, the entire
gift to the class of his children is void, and none of Mr. Smith’s
children may inherit under his will. 78
76. Subject to the child in gestation exception discussed supra § I.
77. Generally, a validating life is any individual who can affect the vesting
of the interest and whose life establishes that the interest will vest or fail within
the Rule against Perpetuities period. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10,
at 303-04. Either of Mr. Smith’s parents, being in control of his cryopreserved
sperm, would thus qualify as validating lives so long as the child’s interest
vested within twenty-one years of each parent’s lifetime.
78. Though in this scenario it likely would not matter, as a voiding of the
clause would resign his property to intestate succession, and his children would
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This scenario, while improbable, highlights the potential
problems caused by the interaction of the Rule against
Perpetuities and advances in assisted reproductive technology.
The scenario is also now technologically possible and certainly
not the most far-fetched logically possible scenario that can be
conjured.
Perhaps even more alarming is the possibility that a person
may have had sperm cryogenically preserved and not have
informed anyone of this fact before dying. This scenario is very
difficult to disprove with certainty and creates the possibility of
post-mortem conception in almost every death. 79 As a society,
we want to avoid being in a position where we must invalidate
An
every bequest “to my children” made since 1949. 80
alternative rule must be developed.
III. ANALYSIS
A. HOW TO HANDLE INTESTATE SUCCESSION
The two questions presented by the intersection of
succession and advances in reproductive technology can be
broken down into those concerning testate succession and those
concerning intestate succession. Of the two, testate succession
and the effect of the Rule against Perpetuities presents the more
intellectually interesting question. However, the more pressing
question and the one that has given rise to actual controversies
is how to handle the intestate succession status of posthumously
conceived children. As previously noted, several courts have
dealt with these questions; the consensus shows a strong
favoring of the child’s right to inherit intestate.
most likely inherit that way.
79. Even if one could prove that a dead man’s sperm was not secretly
cryopreserved during his life, we are not that far away from medical technology
being able to clone the sperm cells of a dead man. Scientists have already
discovered methods for freezing spermatological stem cells, raising the
possibility that cells can be frozen, thawed, cloned and refrozen. See Bailey,
supra note 12, at 745 (“[S]cientists at the University of Pennsylvania and the
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center recently discovered a method
for freezing spermatological stem cells, thereby raising the possibility of
thawing, duplicating and implanting sperm cells for a century or more.”). With
these technological advances come even more radical possibilities for postmortem parentage.
80. A possibility which Bailey suggests is the state of the law. See id. at
790-91 (arguing that the possibility of post-mortem-conception children voids
any bequest “to my children,” as well as a bequest “to the children of my good
friend Frank Jones,” in any state with the classic Rule against Perpetuities).
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Statutory attempts to solve problems associated with
assisted reproductive technology and succession law generally
conflict with court decisions. While case-law has extended the
time period when a child can inherit intestate (and be eligible for
Social Security survivors benefits) after his or her father dies, 81
the Uniform Parentage Act 82 provides only a 300 day period. 83
Similarly, the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception
Act does not consider a posthumously born child the legal
offspring of the deceased parent. 84
In State ex rel. Henderson v. Woods, 85 the court used
definitive language in establishing the constitutional right to a
legal determination of parentage. 86 While such a right has yet to
be invoked in any case involving a posthumously conceived
child, 87 there is little reason to believe that courts would limit
this right to children whose parents are alive at their conception
or birth. Similarly, while no court has held that treating
pretermitted children 88 and posthumously conceived children
differently for the purposes of determining intestate succession
violates the equal protection clause, 89 such a conclusion might
flow from the reasoning set forth in Trimble. 90
81. See Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002).
82. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a) (2002).
83. An important change that must be made to any statute/court opinion or
statutory scheme dealing with this issue is that the time period should be
changed from one concerning the date of birth, to one concerning the date of
conception. In Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, the plaintiff gave birth to her
deceased husband’s child ten and one-half months after his death. 371 F. 2d
593 (9th Cir. 2004). Assuming thirty days per month, the birth occurred 315
days after the husband’s death, missing the assumed validity period of the
Uniform Parentage Act by only fifteen days; had the baby been born two weeks
early, there may have been no controversy. Creating a situation where there is
incentive to try and induce early delivery serves the best interests of no one.
84. See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILD. OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4(b)
(1988).
85. 865 P.2d 33 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
86. “The child has a constitutionally protected interest in an accurate
determination of paternity.” Id. at 37.
87. Kerekes, supra note 2, at 226.
88. Pretermitted children are those alive at the time of a parent’s death.
89. Kerekes, supra note 2, at 226.
90. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). In Trimble, the Court
concluded that "imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for
his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual - as well as an
unjust - way of deterring the parent." 430 U.S. at 769-70.
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It does not make sense to argue that illegitimate children
have a right to inherit under intestate succession 91 but that
posthumously conceived children do not. While it is possible,
and perhaps even likely, that the father of an illegitimate child
never intended to have that child, there is little reason for a man
to have stored sperm (thereby giving rise to the possibility of
posthumous conception) unless he intended it to be used to
conceive his biological heir.
Two different issues are involved in these situations, and I
suggest a two-pronged analysis. Of the three major cases that
have dealt with succession rights of posthumously conceived
children, 92 all have dealt with rights to receive Social Security
survivor's benefits. None of the three cases discussed whether a
child conceived by post-mortem conception can inherit from a
father intestate.
Where Social Security benefits are concerned, any child born
to the man’s wife or partner should qualify for survivors benefits.
This reasoning follows from the ruling in Gillett-Netting, 93
merely extending the time beyond the eighteen-month period
that was at issue in that case. Unlike intestate inheritance from
the estate of the deceased, survivor's benefits come from the
government; hence, there is no adversarial interest on behalf of
others who are in line to inherit from the estate.
Where problems arise concerning intestate succession of an
estate, 94 leaving the estate open for the remainder of the life of
the decedent’s spouse or partner is inefficient. This could force
others who have the possibility of inheriting through intestate
succession to wait for a prolonged period. A time period should
be defined under which the spouse or partner can bear the child
of the decedent and have it be considered as the decedent’s heir
for intestate succession. Rather than attempting to define a time
period, I will focus on setting out guidelines for how such a
period should be selected.
A reasonable period for mourning should be allowed and
91. See id. at 770-71.
92. Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002), Hart v.
Charter (Soc. Sec. Admin. Hearing) (March 27, 1995) (Torres, A.L.J.), and
Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F. 3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). See supra § II.B.
93. Hart was settled out of court during the appeals process. See Girl to Get
Benefits in Death of Father Before Conception, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 1996, at
A13.
94. Such a problem would arise in the case of an unmarried couple in a
state where in the absence of surviving issue, the intestate estate goes to the
parents or siblings of the decedent.
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should be determined by an appropriate body which would
include both legal and mental health experts. There would then
be a reasonable period for the spouse or partner to attempt to
become pregnant using the decedent’s cryopreserved sperm.
This period would take into account current success rates and
provide for multiple attempts if necessary. 95 By utilizing such a
method of determining rights of intestate succession, a valid
attempt is made to allow the spouse or partner to fulfill the
wishes of the decedent to have a child (though he may not have
contemplated that it would be posthumous), while
acknowledging the interests of other parties in a speedy and
absolute settling of the estate.
B. CHANGE THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES?
The problems associated with the Rule against Perpetuities
only present themselves in the case of testate succession because
there is no creation of an interest without a will. In analyzing
the treatment of posthumously conceived children, the following
normative judgments are made:
It is necessary that all posthumously conceived children
born to the decedent’s spouse or partner be treated the same
unless the decedent specifically provided for differentiation.
It is necessary that all posthumously conceived children
contemplated by the decedent be treated the same, unless the
decedent explicitly provided for differentiation.
It is preferable, but not necessary, that posthumously
conceived children be treated the same as children
alive/conceived at the time of the father’s death. 96
These judgments help to ensure that children are not placed
into different, disadvantageous legal situations due to factors
beyond their control. To do otherwise would jeopardize a
posthumously conceived child’s “constitutionally protected
interest in an accurate determination of paternity.” 97
95. The time period presumably would vary as technology progresses and in
vitro attempts attain a higher success rate.
96. The first and second judgments ensure that a scheme will not be subject
to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause for granting children
substantially different legal rights based solely on birth order. While it would
be preferable from a normative point of view to treat posthumously-conceived
children and pretermission children the same, no court has held this necessary
as a matter of law.
97. Kerekes, supra note 2, at 226 (citing State ex rel. Henderson v. Woods,
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Many suggestions have been made regarding the proper way
to modify or eliminate the Rule against Perpetuities, either
entirely or insofar as it affects the post-mortem conception issue.
Some of the more provocative suggestions are discussed below.
When viewed in light of the above mentioned criteria, all of these
plans are unsatisfactory because they either treat posthumously
conceived children differently for purposes of testate succession
or treat posthumously conceived children contemplated by the
decedent differently, or they make a distinction between
posthumously conceived children and pretermitted children
when there is no offsetting gain in ease of applicability. Those
proposals which attempt to minimize or eliminate instances
where they break from the above criteria do so by enacting a
scheme which violates the constitutional boundaries established
in previous court rulings. 98
i. Changes Already in Place
Some commentators have suggested that the problem of
post-mortem children and the Rule against Perpetuities can be
solved through modifications of the rule. 99 In fact, many states
have already adopted modifications of the Rule against
Perpetuities. 100 The three main variations being implemented
are the cy pres doctrine and two versions of the wait-and-see
rule: the common law period and the ninety-year period. 101
865 P.2d 33, 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994)).
98. The two most important court rulings that the suggested plans risk
violating are Henderson, 865 P.2d 33 (1994) and Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
726 (1997). The Henderson court found a constitutionally protected right to a
determination of parenthood. 865 P.2d at 37. In Trimble, the Court found
unequal treatment of children based on legitimacy in determination of intestate
succession rights to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 430 U.S. at
762. The important characteristic of these decisions is that they were both
based on constitutional rights, so a scenario presented which violates either of
these holdings could not be gotten around with mere legislative action.
99. See, e.g., Steeb, supra note 4, at 160 (discussing the Uniform Probate
Code’s determination concerning after born children, as well as the perspectives
of the cy pres doctrine and the wait-and-see doctrine).
100. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, at 327-28 (noting that six
states have adopted a “wait-and-see for the Common Law Perpetuities Period”
approach, and that twenty-six states have at some point adopted the Uniform
Statutory Rule against Perpetuities).
101. The ninety-year wait-and-see rule was adopted under the Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) in 1974. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §
2-901(a)(1) (2006) (canonizing the ninety-year wait-and-see rule). USRAP also
superseded the wait-and-see common law rule during the same year. See id. §
2-906. Under USRAP, a bequest is deemed valid if it complies with either
variant of the wait-and-see rule. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, at 326.
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However, none of the modifications, in and of themselves, will
save a testamentary disposition “to all my children” from the
voiding clause of the Rule against Perpetuities.
The wait-and-see approach was first advocated by Harvard
Law School Professor W. Barton Leach. 102 Under a wait-and-see
approach, an interest is not voided at the time of creation merely
because it might violate the Rule against Perpetuities. Instead,
an appropriate time period is allowed to see if an actual violation
occurs. 103 An appropriate time period can be whatever is
decided upon by the legislature, but the two most common
approaches are the common law period, and the ninety-year
period included in the Uniform Statutory Rule against
Perpetuities. 104
The cy pres doctrine “reforms a document to make the
bequests conform to the Rule against Perpetuities if the
testator’s intent can be protected.” 105 Such a method would be
ineffective in constructing an adequate situation where postmortem-conception children are concerned because of the myriad
of logical possibilities that can occur. New assisted reproductive
technologies greatly increase the complexity of the cy pres
analysis for a court because they give rise to a much broader
range of scenarios that will violate the Rule against
Perpetuities. 106
Neither the common law wait-and-see approach, nor the
ninety-year wait-and-see approach will be sufficient to fix the
problem. The common law wait-and-see approach fails, for
example, in a case where a child was born twenty-one years after
the death of his father. 107

102. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, at 326-27.
103. Id. at 327.
104. The wait-and-see common law rule only invalidates a bequest when the
interest neither vests nor fails within a life in being plus twenty-one years. As
such, this approach considers actual events, and not logically possible events,
when applying the Rule against Perpetuities. See id. at 327. The ninety-year
wait-and-see rule simply requires that an interest vest within ninety years of
the testator’s death, thus eliminating the need for validating lives and
minimizing the impact of improbable but possible deaths. See id. at 327-28.
105. Steeb, supra note 4, at 160.
106. See Hoffman & Morriss, supra note 13, at 611-12. By increasing the
constraints on what a court can do, the courts will become more limited in their
ability to satisfy the donor’s intent while making sure that the modification does
not violate the Rule against Perpetuities.
107. See Baby Born from 21-Year-Old Sperm, supra note 24.
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While a real-world situation that would violate the ninetyyear wait-and-see rule is undoubtedly rare, it is logically and
technologically possible. 108 A ninety-year wait-and-see rule
presents a problem by putting the burden on those waiting to
inherit to disprove a possibility of post-mortem conception
during those ninety years. It would be almost impossible to
prove the non-existence of cryopreserved sperm, leading to
situations where every gift “to my children” is in limbo for ninety
years following a man’s death.
ii. The “Rule of Convenience”
The “rule of convenience”, created by Professor Barton
Leach 109 and outlined by Professor Kristine Knaplund closes a
class as soon as the interest vests in at least one member of the
class. 110 The rule of convenience is supposed to balance three
conflicting concerns of the common law Rule against
Perpetuities: the presumption that the testator intended to
include all members of a class, the presumption that a testator
would prefer speedy dissolution of his or her estate, and the
presumption that a testator would want his or her gift to survive
Knaplund outlines five
the Rule against Perpetuities. 111
scenarios where the rule of convenience would come into play.
Two of Knaplund’s scenarios are particularly troubling, both
in light of morality and the current state of the law. 112 The first
troubling scenario involves situations where “the will devises
something ‘to my children’ and there are children at the father’s
death.” 113 Under the “rule of convenience,” the class of children
who would inherit is then closed at the father’s death. While
this allows a definitive answer regarding who has a right to
inherit, it cuts off all after-born heirs. Some may argue that this
is an unacceptable solution because it cuts off all after-born heirs
when there is no evidence of the decedent’s intent to do so.
There is also an argument to be made that because the father’s
will included a class rather than naming specific individuals, he
108. See Ashley, supra note 23.
109. See Hoffman & Morriss, supra note 13, at 614.
110. See Knaplund, supra note 5, at 108.
111. Id.
112. The other three scenarios include: the father’s will expressly includes
post-mortem children in its terms, the will is silent on children, and the will
devises a remainder to the decedent’s children. Id. at 110. These scenarios
would necessitate the change envisioned by the rule of convenience, but would
not lead to objectionable situations involving posthumously conceived children.
113. Id.
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intended to include all members of the class and not just the
individual members of the class of which he knew. 114
Furthermore, such a distinction between heirs based on time of
birth could give rise to constitutional equal protection claims
from the posthumously conceived child. 115 A court is thus forced
to differentiate between illegitimate children alive at the time of
the father’s death and posthumously conceived children. Despite
these weaknesses, this solution is acceptable and necessary.
The second troubling scenario, outlined by Knaplund, is one
in which the father dies, leaves a bequest “to all my children,”
has no children at the time of his death, but his cryopreserved
sperm is later used to conceive a child. 116 In this case, the rule of
convenience would close the class of the father’s children at the
birth of the first posthumously conceived child. This child would
then inherit the entire bequeathment, and any other
posthumously conceived children would not be members of the
class, thus inheriting nothing. Even though the court would
likely draw a distinction between living and after-born children
so as to allow this scenario, it is doubtful that it would find a
distinction based solely on birth order constitutional. The rule of
convenience therefore, in at least one scenario, gives rise to
unsatisfactory results and must be rejected as a satisfactory
answer to the problem in and of itself.
iii. Repealing the Rule Against Perpetuities
Some have argued for the complete repeal of the Rule
against Perpetuities. 117 The justification for repealing the rule
is that the purpose for which it was originally invented is no
longer a concern of modern society:
[L]ogic could lead one to argue that a social policy device first sculpted
to prevent the aggregation of assets in the hands of several hundred
noble families at a time when London, the largest city in the common
law world, had less than 10,000 inhabitants, has outlived its

114. See id. at 108.
115. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (holding that differentiating
the status of children for inheritance purposes based on legitimacy was
unconstitutional).
116. See Knaplund, supra note 5, at 109.
117. See, e.g., Keith L. Butler, Long Live the Dead Hand: A Case for Repeal of
the Rule Against Perpetuities in Washington, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1237 (2000); G.
Graham Waite, Let's Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL EST. L.J. 93
(1992); Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or The RAP
Has No Friends--An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601 (2000).
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justification. While certain ownership patterns were politically and
economically undesirable for a feudal sovereign, these patterns do not
present a clear danger in our modern society. 118

While repealing the rule would end the problem, a host of
new problems would emerge. 119 Professors Levin and Mulroney
suggest that the rule could be replaced by a carefully constructed
estate tax, 120 but it is unclear how this would provide guidance
in determining the status of posthumously conceived children
under a “to all my children” bequest. If we are going to set an
arbitrary deadline for the child to be born following the father’s
death, it is unclear why we could not do this by merely extending
the Rule against Perpetuities vesting period by this same
amount of time. 121
iv. Case-by-Case Exclusion
Another suggestion is to exclude posthumously conceived
children on a case-by-case basis. “If an interest would be invalid
under the common law Rule [against Perpetuities] by including
after-born persons within a class, after-borns shall be excluded
from the class to the extent necessary to avoid a violation under
the common law Rule.” 122 This rule is problematic, however,
because it would exclude all posthumously conceived children
whose inheritance would violate the Rule against Perpetuities,
even those specifically provided for (either individually or as a
class) in the decedent’s will. 123

118. Hoffman & Morriss, supra note 13, at 618 (quoting Leonard Levin &
Michael Mulroney, The Rule against Perpetuities and Generation-Skipping Tax:
Do We Need Both?, 35 VILL. L. Rev. 333, 356 (1990)).
119. In addition to the problems which the rule was originally intended to
solve, problems added by the possibility of posthumously conceived children
would be how to craft a plan that would allow living children to take from the
estate while acknowledging the possibility of future born heirs, and their right
to inherit.
120. Hoffman & Morriss, supra note 13, at 619. The estate tax would be
crafted in such a way as to make long-term control of assets “prohibitively
expensive.” Hoffman & Morriss acknowledge that this is a very unlikely
scenario, as the government is currently considering whether to phase out the
estate tax permanently. Id.
121. It is important to note that setting an arbitrary deadline may give rise
to the constitutional issue discussed supra § II – B.
122. Hoffman & Morriss, supra note 13, at 620 (quoting Ira Mark Bloom,
Perpetuities Refinement: There Is an Alternative, 62 WASH. L. Rev. 23, 70
(1987)).
123. See id. at 621.
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v. Hoffman/Morriss Proposal
Hoffman and Morriss propose including a provision in any
will that does not mention posthumously conceived children,
providing that “nothing in this will shall be construed to provide
an inheritance for any posthumously born individuals.” 124
This adaptation of the Hoffman/Morriss proposal is
problematic both because of the logistical problems with
implementing it and its application to real world scenarios. 125
What if the decedent provided for all his posthumously born
children, without regard to the identity of the mother? The
Hoffman/Morriss proposal does not provide a way for this
bequest to survive a Rule against Perpetuities problem, even
though the rule would presumably honor the explicit request of
the decedent. Morriss and Hoffman claim that the perpetuities
problems can be solved by “saving” clauses, instructing courts to
construe testate documents in ways that would not violate the
Rule against Perpetuities. 126 However such a claim is shortsighted. Saving clauses will be ineffective in dealing with the
possibility of posthumously conceived children born centuries
after the death of the father. Morriss and Hoffman have not
modified the rule’s logical possibility provisions, and no saving
clause is good in perpetuity. 127
vi. Redefine a Life in Being
It has been suggested that a “life in being” for purposes of
validating an interest should be redefined to include the entire
time period of a male’s reproductive capacity. 128 Other possible
redefinitions of a life in being are to extend the decedent’s life in
being for a set time, the lifetime of the woman to whom the
cryopreserved sperm was left, or the time period in which the
woman to whom the cryopreserved sperm was left remains

124. Id. at 624. The presumption would be rebuttable. Id.
125. For instance, what standard of proof would be needed to rebut the
presumption? Also, the decedent’s spouse/partner, the person who is most likely
to know the intentions of the decedent, is not a disinterested party.
126. Id. at 627 (explaining that “‘savings’ clauses . . . instruct courts to fix
problems that may arise”).
127. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, at 312. A savings clause is
used in conjunction with a trust. The savings clause is designed to “terminate
the trust . . . at the expiration of specified measuring lives plus 21 years, if the
trust has not previously terminated.” Id.
128. See Kerekes, supra note 2, at 242.
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unmarried. 129
Redefining a life in being to include a man’s reproductive
capabilities may have been a viable option a decade ago, but with
the recent advances in reproductive technology and the
possibility raised by scientists that sperm can be cryogenically
preserved for centuries, 130 this is no longer a viable option.
Defining a life in being as the time period of a male’s
reproductive capability has the effect of bestowing immortality,
and a bequest has the possibility of surviving a challenge to the
Rule against Perpetuities in perpetuity.
Redefining the term life in being to include a set amount of
time after the death of the father is undesirable for two reasons.
First, it violates the criteria set out in the beginning of this
section that all posthumously conceived children be afforded
equal treatment.
Second, it could place whomever the
cryopreserved sperm was bequeathed to in a position where that
person must make a choice between using it to conceive a child
before he or she is physically or emotionally ready, and
alternatively waiting and sacrificing some of the posthumous
child’s legal rights.
Measuring the life based on the status of the woman to
whom the cryopreserved sperm has been left has some validity.
However, such a modification assumes that only a bequest to the
female partner of the decedent would be made or allowed. In
doing so, it fails to provide for the Mr. Smith hypothetical, supra,
where the sperm is left to a party for its eventual use by a third
party who is not the decedent’s wife or partner.
vii. Proposed Solution
The proposed solution involves excluding, as a bright-line
rule, posthumously conceived children from a bequest “to all my
children.” This scenario does away with any arbitrary time
periods under which a child can be conceived and considered as
included in the class of the decedent’s children.
There is one scenario that still gives rise to a problem, the
answer to which is not clear under the above-mentioned
proposal. Imagine that a husband and wife are attempting to
conceive a child by artificial insemination. On his way to work,
the husband is involved in a fatal accident. Unaware of this, his
129. See id. at 242-43. If the woman to whom the cryopreserved sperm was
left remarry, she would need to file a sworn statement of intent not to use the
sperm. Id. at 43.
130. See Q & A: Frozen Sperm, supra note 23.
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wife proceeds to her appointment that afternoon and undergoes
successful insemination. The child would, strictly speaking, be
posthumously conceived. The first reaction to this problem
might be to create a one-day grace period, but certainly there are
situations where two or three days might pass. What about the
soldier’s wife whose husband is captured and she undergoes this
procedure during the weeks or months when his status is
unknown? It would be better to add a reasonable knowledge
requirement instead of having a grace period in these situations.
The spouse or partner undergoing artificial insemination must
know, or should reasonably know, of the demise of her spouse or
partner. While there will still be questions as to when it would
be reasonable to presume knowledge, these are now questions of
fact, and as such can more easily be dealt with on a case-by-case
basis.
For circumstances where there is a provision in the will for
posthumous children, different analyses must be used depending
on the nature of the bequest. Two types of posthumous bequests
are possible: those that pick out a limited class of posthumously
conceived children and those made to a general class, “to my
posthumously conceived children.”
For those bequests that pick out a limited class of
posthumously conceived children, the bequest would be allowed
to stand. For instance, if a man were to leave half of his estate
to “his first posthumously conceived child,” half of his estate
could be held in trust for said child. Even if such a child were
never to be conceived, the bequest would still be valid, and the
inheritance would just be held in a perpetual trust. 131 Though
this would treat two posthumously born children different based
solely on their birth order, the decedent’s will expresses an
explicit wish to do so. Just as it is legally permissible to leave
one’s entire estate to one’s firstborn child and nothing to all
other children, 132 it would be legally permissible to provide only
for the first posthumously conceived child. A similar analysis is

131. If some upper end to the viability of cryogenically preserved sperm is
later found, the trust would expire at the end of this viability period.
132. In the case where pretermitted children are omitted from a will, section
2-302 of the Uniform Probate Code provides a share of the estate to the omitted
child unless “it appears that the omission was intentional.” Steeb, supra note 4,
at 158 (quoting UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302(b)(1)). In the circumstances where
the first posthumously conceived child is identified as such, it is fair to surmise
that this clause intentionally excluded all after-born posthumous children.

GREENFIELD J. Dad Was Born A Thousand Years Ago? An Examination of Post-Mortem
Conception and Inheritance, with a Focus on the Rule Against Perpetuities. MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 2006;8(1):277-302.

2007] POST-MORTEM CONCEPTION AND INHERITANCE

301

applicable if a clause in the will were to divide a portion of the
decedent’s estate among “the first x posthumous children born,”
or “any posthumous children born within time period y.” Though
these later scenarios present potential perpetuities problems, the
rule can be adjusted using a combination of provisions from the
modified rules already in place, while still falling within the
three provisions outlined in the beginning of this section.
Any bequest “to all of my posthumously conceived children”
would be invalidated. The decedent’s estate would be divided as
if the provision did not exist. 133 This solution is no worse then
the treatment of other created interests which violate the Rule
against Perpetuities. The benefit from this proposal is that it
provides to those who are alive and are supposed to inherit a
portion of the decedent’s finality in their possession of the estate.
It should also be noted that post-mortem-conception children
who have a bequeathment to them invalidated under this rule
will still be eligible for Social Security survivors benefits so long
as they meet the criteria set out in § III(A)(i) supra.
IV. CONCLUSION
Technology has advanced at rates far outpacing other facets
of our intellectual lives; this is perhaps truer than in the field of
biology than anywhere else. Despite the recognition over four
decades ago of the problems that would be posed by advances in
reproductive technology, the legislative and executive branches
of our government have not seen fit to come up with a
satisfactory solution. The courts have thus been left in a
position where they must interpret laws that were written
without contemplation of today’s technology and decide how to
apply them to situations never envisioned by the drafters. More
troubling for the legal community is that court decisions can
quickly be made obsolete by even further advances in technology.
A comprehensive scheme must be adapted to deal with the
advances in reproductive technology which takes account of past
court rulings and common law principles, yet remains flexible
enough to deal with situations that were not contemplated by
the drafters of these rulings/principles.
Many options have been put forth for how to deal with the
problems posed by advancing technology. Some of the earlier

133. This is the same treatment given to normal testamentary interests that
violate the Rule against Perpetuities. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10,
ch. 4(E)(4).
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proposed solutions fail because they did not realize the eventual
possibilities that would develop, nor the widespread
implementation and success of the technology. Others are
unsatisfactory because they do not realize that we are not
starting on a clean slate, but must make any new scheme fit the
basic principles of past rulings/principles.
When it comes to testate succession, it seems best to enact
clear bright-line rules that are independent of current
technological practices and that rely on best matching the
decedent’s intent with the original purpose of the Rule against
Perpetuities. By disallowing the inclusion of posthumously
conceived children from inclusion in an “all my children” clause,
we ensure that estates will not be indefinitely held in trust,
thereby decreasing their social utility.
The same socially
negative effect would be possible if testate clauses picking out all
posthumously conceived children were allowed. By still allowing
for testators to single out particular posthumously conceived
children or determinable groups of posthumously conceived
children, people are given the chance to ensure that their estate
is distributed in the manner they most prefer.
By setting a firm cutoff for children to inherit under
intestate succession, bereaved parties are given the opportunity
to fulfill the wishes of deceased loved ones, even if those wishes
were not explicitly stated in a will. The harshness of this cutoff
is blunted by allowing posthumously conceived children to be
eligible for Social Security survivor's benefits.
The proposal set forth in this article also takes into account
current technology and possible advances in future technology,
thus preventing situations encountered in the past when
proposed solutions were shortsighted in scope.
Finally, this proposal falls within the framework laid out by
the courts for intestate succession while maximizing the rights of
the posthumously conceived child, without unduly burdening
others in line for intestate succession. Similarly, the proposed
methods for fixing problems relating to the Rule against
Perpetuities provides for equal protection of equally situated
posthumously conceived children, while trying to maximize
respect for the decedent’s wishes without undoing the purpose
for which the rule was first enacted.

